Shota Shiukashvili, Junior Researcher, RISS
More than three months have passed since Ukraine launched its long-awaited counteroffensive. In anticipation of it, Ukrainian troops have been trained in allied countries while the West continued delivering much-needed weapons to Kyiv. So far, Ukrainians have been conducting counteroffensive operations in six sectors of the front, namely in the Lyman direction, Bakhmut area, Avdiivka-Donetsk city front, western Donetsk Oblast, on the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, as well as in the Western Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblast.
The widely acclaimed goal of Ukraine's counteroffensive has been to break through the Russian defensive lines towards Melitopol and Berdyansk directions, in order to cut off Russia’s land bridge to Crimea. However, despite some Western observers having expected a sweeping Ukrainian counteroffensive resulting in rapid territorial advances, so far the Ukrainian gains have been slower.
Rising skepticism
Over the past three months Ukrainian armed forces have made some gains by liberating a dozen villages. Most importantly, they have breached Russian defences around the east of Robotyne on the Zaporizhzhia axis. However, as winter approaches, the predictions are less optimistic, with some analysts viewing the counter-offensive as slow-paced and likely to be stalled soon. The US General Mark Milley has cautioned that Ukraine has about six weeks before adverse weather conditions start to impede its counteroffensive efforts.. In response to the rising skepticism, the Ukrainian Chief of the Defence Intelligence Kyrylo Budanov stated that the counteroffensive will continue despite more severe weather conditions in the coming months.
According to the Washington Post’s recent piece, which draws on its sources from the US intelligence community, Ukraine will be unable to reach Melitopol, hence Kyiv will fail to cut Crimea from Russia. Furthermore, it has been reported that the US officials have encouraged Ukrainians to focus on the main axis of the counter-offensive in the south, however Ukrainians remain to be significantly engaged in the east, in their bid to recapture Bakhmut. Instead of large mechanised assaults, Ukraine is attempting to apply steady pressure on the Russian forces along the frontline, trying to generate gaps in well-prepared Russian defences, first to be exploited locally and then for deeper intrusions. Such approach has previously come in handy both in 2022 Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives.
Reasons behind the slow pace of counteroffensive
While Ukraine had to wait for months for the Western weapon platforms and ammunition supplies, Russia was preparing a series of defensive fortifications throughout the occupied parts of Ukraine. According to CSIS, these Russian fortifications in Ukraine represent “the most extensive defensive works in Europe since World War II”. Thus, a concentration of Ukrainian forces in a single sector and a subsequent frontal attack to breach the Russian lines could easily turn into a bloodbath for Ukrainians. Furthermore, Ukrainian forces have to work through heavily mined fields as they advance by 500m to 2km per day.
Unsurprisingly, the most attention has been paid to Ukraine’s counteroffensive operations in the south of the country, in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. After the Russian withdrawal from the city of Kherson in November, a new Russian defensive line was established across the rural areas of southern Ukraine. Unlike much of Ukraine, the south is flat, comprising vast areas of open fields, making it perilous for Ukrainian advances as they can be easily targeted by the Russian artillery and air capabilities. Furthering this peril is the extensive and dense network of defensive capabilities Russia has been constructing for over a year. These include anti-tank ditches, razor wire, earthen berms, a network of trenches and hundreds of square kilometres of minefields as well as extra fortifications around important cities of Tokmak.
Tokmak in particular is a critical point as capturing it may allow Ukraine to advance towards Melitopol and split the Russian forces in the south. Importantly, splitting the Russian forces in the south would also cut the Russian land connection off Crimea with the only remaining connection being the bridge, the segments of which were previously blown up by Ukrainians. Such a split would strain the Russian supply as well as be a detrimental blow to the Kremlin’s political standing.
Ukraine’s key deficiencies
Along with such defensive fortifications, Russia enjoys significant air superiority, as Ukraine lacks close air support capabilities. It is estimated that Russians have fifteen times more jets and attack helicopters than Ukraine. Even though the Netherlands and Denmark decided to donate up to 61 F-16 Fighter Jets to Ukraine, they are unlikely to appear in Ukrainian skies before next year. With Russian air superiority, Ukraine would struggle to make rapid advances.
Additionally, Ukrainian artillery capabilities remain limited. However, to address the Ukrainian shell shortage the United States has started delivering cluster munitions. Compared to the unitary shells, cluster munitions are more effective against targets such as infantry, artillery, and vehicle convoys.
With such force discrepancies, it is greatly challenging for the Ukrainian armed forces to conduct combined arms warfare - complementing armour and infantry attacks, which is much needed to advance through Russian defences. Hence, Ukrainian losses, including losses of Western-supplied tanks and combat vehicles should not come surprising, as they are attacking fortified trenches, surrounded by minefields and dragon’s teeth while coming under heavy artillery and air bombardment.
Russian propaganda in play
Furthermore, Russia has started offering bounties for destroying Western tanks. Previously, Russian Ministry of Defence had been giving out bonuses of 50,000 Rubles ($556) for each destroyed Ukrainian armoured vehicle and 100,000 Rubles ($1112) for each destroyed tank, while a Russian company “Fores” had promised a bounty of 5 million Rubles ($55,556) for the first captured or destroyed American Abrams or the German Leopard 2, and 500,000 ($5556) Rubles for each subsequent one. In conjunction with military value, the destruction of Western tanks holds huge propaganda value for the Kremlin as it can be used to boost Russian morale as well as thwart the Western support for Ukraine and the anticipations of the Ukrainian counteroffensive’s successes.
As significant attention is being paid to the Ukrainian use of the Western military equipment in this counteroffensive, the Russian propaganda machine has been eager to boast of its destruction and capture of Western equipment, such as of the US-donated Bradley Fighting Vehicles, German Leopard 2 tanks and already a British-donated Challenger 2 Tank. The Russian propagandist sources often spread unverified videos of the same incident, filmed from numerous angles whilst claiming them to be separate instances.
More worryingly, some Western media channels have also fallen into the Russian propaganda trap. For instance, Forbes recently published a piece titled “The Ukrainian Army Has Already Lost Half Of Its Unique Leopard 2R Breaching Vehicles”, however Finland had only sent six such tanks and the loss of three of them hardly represents a catastrophe for the Ukrainian fleet of 800 tanks.
The Russian propaganda machine had also reported the destruction of a Leopard 2 tank and had published video evidence of it, which was later exposed to be the destruction of a farm tractor. In reality, the Ukrainian forces have seen minimal tank losses, with only seven out of their 105 Western-manufactured tanks destroyed. Furthermore, additional tanks are on their way to Ukraine as the counteroffensive continues to progress, including 14 more Leopard 2s, 31 M-1 tanks of American origin, and potentially another 145 Leopard 1A5s.
Way ahead
However limited Ukrainian gains may seem, the Ukrainian counteroffensive continues and the Ukrainian tactics are likely to change again, as the Ukrainian officials have often said “plans love silence”. Meanwhile, it is premature to predict the outcome of the Ukrainian counteroffensive as the warfare follows a non-linear pattern, where even the most dynamic campaigns involve phases of swift progress as well as the periods of limited movement. As Zaluzhniy put it: “It is not a show the whole world is watching and betting on or anything. Every day, every meter is given by blood’. Hence, it is best, to remain patient and not consume the picture painted by the Kremlin propaganda, that of the “failed” counteroffensive.
Photo: Viacheslav Ratynskyi/REUTERS
The views expressed in this article are the author’s, and do not represent those of RISS or any other institution.
